United States v. Inadi by Powell, Lewis F, Jr
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1985
United States v. Inadi
Lewis F. Powell Jr
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
United States v. Inadi. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 126. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee




SUPPLEMENTAL ELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 23, 
List 1, 




Cert to CA3 (Adams, Higginbotham 
and Van Dusen) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. CONTENTIONS RAISED IN REPLY BRIEF: In a reply filed on 
May 17, 1985, that petr contends 
flatly conflict with the CA3's decision in this case. In the 
first, United States v. Molt, No. 85-108 @ pril 1, 1985), 




'· "!!.": ,t .. ~ 
pending appeal because the issue he raised was 
S:4ce ~ ;s ~ CA 
is~~AP, r V0~1d ~~J ~ 
c~-P/.,cf ~ -(L f&~~ ---
insubstantial. The issue raised was ,whether evidence of 
conversations between the defendant and his alleged co-
conspirators was admissible without any showing that the co-
~
conspirators were unavailable for cross-examination. The CA7 
co-conspirators' 
statements should be based on the requirements of Rule 
801 (d) (2) (E) [of the Federal Rules of Evidence], not on the Sixth 
Amendment.'" Id., slip op. at 2 (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 737 F.2d 595, 610 (CA7 1984). The court recognized 
that the CA3 had held to the contrary in Inadi, but stated that 
the issue nonetheless was insubstantial because the CA7 was 
unlikely to re-examine its view that there is no requirement that 
the declarant be un~able. 
In the second, Boone v. Marshall, No. 84-3536 (CA6 April 29, 
1985)' the court held that evidence admitted as a co-
conspirator's statement under the hearsay rules automatically 
satisfies the Sixth Amendment. It does not appear that the issue 
was unavailability, rather than reliability, however, because the 
court stated that the declarant would have taken the Fifth if 
called to the stand. 
2. DISCUSSION: The CA 7' s opinion in Molt doe 
conflict with the CA3's decision. Never the less, the 
wish to allow the issue to percolate further. It might also be 
more efficient to wait to address the issue in a case that also 
poses the reliability issue, which has sharply split the Courts 
of Appeals. 
3. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
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No. 84-1580 CFY )2__,_ _ _. _ ./. ·~ . 
,~---~ . c~~~~ 
United States Cert to CA3 (Adams, Higqinbotham 
and Van Dusen) 
v. 
Inadi (narcotics) Federal/Criminal Timely 
5G-~:~~~~ 
~~--- ,}Gz;t;r ~~~h 
1. SUMMARY: The qovernment contends that the CA3 erred in 
holdin~?hefCJrrl;,e~c~~e~o-
~ hu--vt---. 
conspirator's out-of-court statement, the Confrontation Clause 
requires the prosecution to establish the co-conspirator's 
/ 
t 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: After a jury trial in the 
ED Pa, resp was convicted of conspirfng to manufacture and 
distribute methamphetamine, using the telephone to faci 1 i tate a 
drug felony, causing interstate travel to facilitate a drug 
felony, and distributing methamephetamine. The evidence at trial 
consisted of the testimony of an unindicted co-conspirator, 
McKeon, who stated that he had an aareement with resp that he and 
another unindicted co-conspirator, Levan, would manufacture 
methamphetamine with chemicals supplied by resp, who would be 
responsible for distributing the final product. McKeon reported 
that he successfully manufactured two batches of the drug, but 
failed at a third attempt. He took the residue from that third 
"cook" to an empty house in May, New Jersey, where he, resp, 
Levan, co-conspirator Lazaro, and two others attempted to extract 
methamphetamine from the residue. Acting pursuant to a warrant, 
~olice surreptitiously searched the house and removed the tray in 
which the residue was being dried. 
DEA agents testified at trial that they observed a meeting 
between resp and Lazaro in the parking lot of a Philadelphia 
restaurant on May 25, 1980. Because they observed resp lean into 
the car at one point, the DEA agents followed Lazaro, stopped him, 
and searched the car. The agents found nothing, although they 
later returned to the scene of the search and found a plastic bag 
containing methamphetamine, which apparently had been thrown under 
the car during the search. The evidence admitted at trial also 
consisted of five telephone conversations the Cape May police had 
lawfully intercepted between May 2 3 to May 27, 1980. In the 
/ first, Lazaro asked resp in code for methamphetamine and reported 
' 
on the residue missing from the Cape May ' house. In the second, 
Lazaro and resp arranged the meeting that the DEA agents observed. 
In the third, Lazaro reported to resp that he had been stopped by 
the DEA agents, but had managed to kick the plastic bag under the 
car. The fourth conversation involved a discussion between McKeon 
and Lazaro's wife about the DEA agents stopping the car, and the 
fifth, which was between Levan and Lazaro, involved a discussion 
of the missing residue and the May 25th DEA stop~ 
Resp objected to the admission of the five recordings on the 
-"\ 
grounds that they did not satisfy the requirements of the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 
80l{d) (2) (E), and that the introduction of Lazaro's statements 
violated the Confrontation Clause because the prosecution had not 
shown that Lazaro was unavailable to testify. The DC ruled that 
the statements satisfied Rule 80l(d) (2) (E), and that the 
Confrontation Clause was not violated by the introduction of 
Lazaro's statements. According to petr, the DC admitted the 
statements in reliance upon the prosecution's representation that 
Resp maintains that the DC 
conditionally admitted the conversations in reliance on the 
prosecution's representation that she would produce Lazaro and 
that he would refuse to testify, and that the DC later lifted the 
condition that Lazaro be produced without addressing resp's 
objectionv 
The CA3 agreed that Lazaro's statements, which it described 




admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 801Cd) (2) (E) because there was 
sufficient proof that Lazaro was a co-c'onspirator., The court - ' 
rev~_n the ground that ere-y~-a-~""i=o=n=C=l:;-~ u-s-el 
required that the government either produce Lazaro for cross-
examination or establish that he was unavailable to testify. The 
court noted that this ·Court has stated that the Confrontation 
Clause establishes a "rule of necessity" and that "in the usual 
case ..• the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the 
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use 
against the defendant." ~io v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
While Roberts stated in a footnote that there might be an 
exceptional circumstance in which a demonstration of 
unavailability would not be required, where the utility of 
confrontation was remote, for example, id. , at 6 5 n. 7, the 
prosecution did not rely upon the footnote, and this case does not 
present such an exceptional circumstance. 
The court rejected the government's argument that it had met 
the burden of establishing unava i labi 1 i ty by representing that 
Lazaro would refuse to testify. The minimal showing of 
unavailability that will satisfy the Confrontation Clause is 
established by Fed. R. Ev id 80 4, which defines "unavai lability" 
for the purposes of the hearsay rules, read in conjunction with 
Barber v. Paoe, 390 u.s. 719, 724-725 (1968), which held that the 
government must make a good faith effort to obtain the declarant's 
presence at trial. The government's assertions that Lazaro would 
refuse to testify are insufficient, because "every veteran trial 
judge has experienced the situation where a hostile witness 
' 
J 
discards his 'stonewalling' tactics when faced with an imminent 
I 
contempt citation." Petn 15a. The government issued a subpeona 
at the DC's suggestion, but when Lazaro failed to respond, 
allegedly because he had car trouble, the government did not seek 
a bench warrant, and made no further efforts to secure his 
attendance. More is required to satisfy Barber's requirement of a 
"good faith effort." The court noted that trial judges would have 
discretion to determine what is a sufficient effort in light of 
the circumstances of the case, and implied that an affidavit from 
the declarant that he would not testify would be sufficient. The 
court remanded for a new trial. ~ 
The Government petitioned for rehearing en bane, arguing for 
the first time that even assuming the correctness of the CA3 's 
ruling on the Confrontation Clause, the court should not have 
remanded for a new trial, but should instead have remanded for a 
hearing regarding Lazaro's availab i_lity. 
--------------------
Rehearing was denied, 
with Judges Hunter, Garth, Sloviter and Becker voting to grant. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that the case presents an 
issue of great practical and doctrinal importance that has split 
the circuits. The CA3's holding that the government must either 
produce the declarant or show that the declarant is unavailable is 
/ 
in accord with the holdings of the CA9, United States v. Ordonez, 
737 F.2d 793, 802 (1984), the ~ , United States v. Lisotto, 722 
F.2d~, 88 (CA4 1983), cert. denied, No. 83-1417 (Mar. 26, 1984), 
the CAS, United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-350 (1981), 
v 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983), and the Wisconsin state courts, 
~ 
State v. Bauer, 109 Wis.2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982). The First, 
( 
/ · v- -...--
Slxth, and Seventh Circuits, and the South Dakota courts, on the 
other hand, have taken the position _that statements ~~lling G hinl 
------··-· . --------.._ ------~ ---
the co-conspirator rule automatically satisfy the Confrontation 
~------------------------------
Clause. United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 133 CCA7 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); United States v. Swainson, 548 
F.2d 657, 661 (CA6), cert. denied, 431 u.s. 937 (1977); Ottomano 
v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (CAl 1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1128 (1973); State v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 338, 342 (S.D. 1984). 
The Confrontation Clause does not impose a requirement of 
unavailability, or any other requirement beyond those embodied in 
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. In ruling to 
the contrary, the CA3 placed too much reliance upon the dictum in 
Roberts, and erroneously read Roberts with "unquestioning 
literalness." What the Court must have meant in the Roberts 
dictum was that where unavailability is a requirement of the 
hearsay exception rules, it will also be a requirement of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Finally, even assuming that the CA3 was correct in holding 
that the government must establish unavailability, the court erred 
in remanding for a new trial rather than merely remanding for a 
hearing to determine whether Lazaro was in fact unavailable, and 
to determine if any error was harmless. The problem of courts of 
appeals reflexively ordering a new trial, when a limited remand 
would do, is a recurring one that deserves this Court's attention. 
Resp contends that the CA3's holding reflects a 
straightforward application of the principles embodied in the 
Confrontation Clause and established in Roberts, supra. This 
! Court has made clear that the hearsay rules are not the exact 
equivalent of the Confrontation Clause. Roberts, supra, Dutton v. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
(1970). The co-conspirator's statement exception to the hearsay 
rule is based on the theory that each co-conspirator is the agent 
of the other, not upon a belief that such statements are 
inherently reliable. Indeed, such statements often are 
untruthful, because co-conspirators deliberately mislead one 
another in an attempt to encourage continued cooperation, or for 
other reasons. Cross-examination of the declarant regarding his 
or her reasons for making a statement may be extremely valuable, 
and where, as here, the statements were in code, cross-examination 
is quite important. The burden of establishing unavailability is 
( slight. Production of the witness would not preclude use of the 
out-of-court statement. The government did not raise the issue of 
a limited remand until its petition for rehearing, despite its 
contention that the problem is a recurring one, and the Court 
therefore need not address the issue. The limited hearing 
suggested by the government would be meaningless, because the 
hearing will not establish whether Lazaro would have refused to 
testify in the face of a contempt charge at the first trial. 
Should the evidence show that Lazaro would have been available, 
there is little likelihood that the trial judge will find that the 
denial of the right to cross-examine was harmless error, given the 
importance of the statements, the fact that they were in code, and 
the fact that the government does not contest the utility of 
cross-examination. 
( 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG's assertion that the circuits are 
.....----· 
sharply split over this issue is just · wrong. 9n1y the CA9 
decision the SG cites squarely held, in accord with the CA3' s 
decision here, that the government must establish unavai labi 1 i ty 
in order to satisfy the ConLrontation Clause. Ordonez, supra. In 
the CA4 and the CAS decisions the SG cites, the declarants' 
availability was not at issue, and the courts mentioned 
unavailability only in quoting or paraphrasing this Court's 
statements in Roberts. The Wisconsin decision cited by the SG 
involved the preliminary hearing testimony of a victim who died 
prior to trial, rather than the co-conspirator exception to the 
hearsay rule, and its quotation of the paragraphs in Roberts 
concerning unavailability was dicta. The Arizona case the SG 
cites indicates that a showing of unavailability is required if 
"the statement was made under circumstances which show doubt as to 
its accuracy or reliability" or if the statement is of crucial 
importance or extremely prejudicial to the defense, but not if the 
utility of confrontation would be insignificant. State v. Martin, 
139 Ariz. 466, 480 (1984). 
v: The only post-Roberts federal decision the SG cites as 
conflicting with the CA3's decision, Kendall, supra, does not 
specifically discuss unavailability, but broadly states that 
extrajudicial statements properly admissible under Rule 
80l(d) (2) (E) do not violate the Sixth Amendment. The remainder of 
the allegedly conflicting federal decisions all were decided prior 
to this Ct's decision in Roberts. The South Dakota case the SG 




of unavailability because no objection had been made at trial. 
I 
Smith, supra, at 341. Thus, there is no square conflict, and few 
courts appear to have directly addressed the issue since Roberts. 
The issue accordingly should be allowed to percolate further. The 
Court has been reluctant to address the more pressing Roberts 
issue whether Roberts' requirement of reliability is 
automatically met if the statement satisfies the co-conspirator 
except ion to the hear say rule, see Sanson v. United States, No. 
83-6454 (June 25, 1984) (WHITE, J., diss. from denial of cert.), 
and I see no need to rush to address the unavailability issue in 
the absence of a square conflict. 
In Roberts, the Court stated that "in conformance with the 
Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth 
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity" and that in the usual 
~~ case, the prosecution accordingly must either produce the 
r j declarant or establish his or her unavailability. The Court gave 
no indication that the "rule of necessity" controlled only in 
those situations where the hearsay rules also required the 
declarant to be unavailable. Thus, the CA3's application of 
Roberts is not clear error. 
] Finally, the issue 
l limited hearing or for 
The Court has indicated 
whether the CA3 should have remanded for a 
a complete new trial is not cert-worthy. 
that where a limited hearing is possible, 
retrial should not be ordered, see Goldberg v. United States, 425 
u.s. 94, 111-112 (1976), so there is no need to take this case to 
establish that principle, especially i:n light of the government's 
failure to raise the harmless error issue, or ask that a remand be 
/ 
limited, prior to the petition for rehearing. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
May 17, 1985 Been Opn in petn 
May 23, 1985 
Court ................... . l-'oted on ................. ·., 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 . . . As~gned ................. ~ 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . .. Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ........ . ....... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
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ABSENT N OT YOTING 
October 29, 1985 
INADI GINA-POW 
84-1580 United States v. Inadi (CA3 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case presents a question under the Confrontation 
Clause that the SG states that: 
"The Court has seldom had before it a 
proposed constitutional rule that would add more 
to the expense and complexity of criminal trials 
while contr ~~ng less to the reliability of 
the outcome the rule adopted by the Court of 
Appeals in this case." Br. p. 10. 
The SG also states that CA3 mistakenly relied on the 
Confrontation Clause to create a new constitutional rule 
when the Court should have applied Rule 801 (d) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that adopts the common law nco-
---___, 
conspirator rule" as an exception to the hearsay rule. ---Rule 80l(d) provides as follows: 
"A statement is not hearsay if ••••• the 
statement is offered against a party and is 
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy." Br. 2. 
CA3, applying the Confrontation Clause, held that the 
prosecution "may not introduce a coconspirator statement 
unless the declarant is produced or the prosecution 
2. 
carries the burden of showing the declarant to be 
unavailable. The SG states that this "constitutional 
rule" would "substantially impair the prosecution of crime 
with no appreciable benefits." 
This Case 
Respondent was convicted on 6 counts for conspiracy 
to manufacture and distribute methamphetime. Much of the 
evidence was based on 5 telephone conversations that were 
- --- I 
transcribed by a judicially authorized wiretaPt · These 
conversations were played at the trial for the jury, and 
respondent had been involved in several of the 
conversations - including those with Lazaro. At trial, 
respondent sought to exclude the recorded statements of 
-----~ --~ - ....... _.........._... 
Lazaro and the other coconspirators on the ground that the 
statements did not satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 
801 (d) (2) (B) that regulates admission of coconspirators 
declarations. Respondent also objected with respect to 
Lazaro's conversation on the ground that since Lazaro was 
-----._/ 
not produced for cross-examination, the Confrontation ......._____, 
Clause required exclusion of this coconspirator's 
statements. The DC ruled against respondent on both ------arguments. The Court of Appeals agreed that Lazaro's 
statements would be admissible under the Coconspirator 
3. 
Rule, but the Court went on to hold that the Confrontation 
Clause requires the government to show the unavailability 
of a non-testifying coconspirator before his out of court 
statements may be admitted in evidence. In so holding, 
CA3 relied primarily on dictum in our decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 u.s. 56, 65 (1980). Unfortunately, the ~Rie ~ 
Court's opinion said "in conformance with the framers 
preference for face to face accusation, the Sixth 
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual 
case the prosecution must either produce or 
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose 
statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 
SG's Argument in brief 
Noting that at common law there are many exceptions 
to the hearsay rule, and that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence - dealing with hearsay - are a codification and 
refinement of the common law approach. In summary, 
although hearsay generally is inadmissible (Rule 802), 
there are more than tQirty exemptions and exceptions. One 
~ ---
of these exemptions, Rule 801 (d) (2)E codifies the common 
law - apporved by this Court years ago - that permits 
) admission of statements made by coconspirators during and 
\ in conspiracy. the 
4. 
coconspirator rule is said to be the most frequently used 
exception to the hearsay rule, but a sharp conflict 
developed as to whether in a case like this one even 
though the coconspirator rule is satisfied, th~ 
Confrontation Clause applies when the government fails to 
show the unavailability of the coconspirator whose 
statements are sought to be introduced. There is an 
exception, however, if the government can establish (i) 
that the coconspirator is unavailable, and (ii) it is 
established that the statements at issue are reliable. 
The SG attributes the present confusion to another 
hearsay exception: that for "prior recorded testimony" -
when, for example, a witness testified in a prior trial 
but is unavailable for a retrial, the prior recorded 
testimony may be admitted. The SG says that because this 
type of hearsay is analogous to "an affidavit or 
deposition" it is "nothing more than an inferior 
substitute for live 
has, tested former 





Accordingly, this Court 
under the Confrontation 
former testimony normally is not 
it can be shown that the witness is 
5. 
The SG argues that CA3 lost sight of the distinction 
----------------------------------------~~ 
between "prior recorded testimony" and "subsequent live 
testimony" as in this case where the coconspirator rule 
appli~·s. The government argues that decisions of this 
Court "do not support the approach of CA3. On the 
1 
contrary, this cases Court's Confrontation Clause 
involving the admission of hearsay take a different three-
part approach: First, hearsay that resembles affidavits 
or depositions have been closely regulated, and it is j1n 
this context that the prosecution must show the 
unavailability of the witness. Second, other "firmly 
routed hearsay exceptions" are presumed to be 
constitutional. And third, the Court has held out the 
possibility that novel hea·rsay exceptions may be subjected 
to more exacting scrutiny". Br. 10 (I am not sure I 
understand this third ground). 
Respondent's Argument in Brief 
Respondent concedes that the wiretapped conversation 
of Lazaro would be admissible under Federal Evidence Rule 
8010?????. But respondent states that the "issue is 
whether the Confrontation Clause affords protection to a 
defendant against out of court declarations. The narrow 
question, therefore, is "whether the government was 
.. 
6. 
obligated by the Constitution to produce the declarant for 
cross-examination or demonstrate his unavailability ... " 
(Emphasis supplied by me) • 
Like the SG, respondent also relies on the early 
history of the Confrontation Clause, states that it "does 
not provide the answer to the question presented", but it 
does "provide useful guidance." Respondent emphasizes the 
importance of the right to cross-examine - a right this 
Court also has emphasized many times. Respondent relies 
on Owen v. Robert, supra, as establishing a rule of 
necessity to the effect that "the prosecution must either 
produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of the 
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against 
defendant." 
I note here that the foregoing statement in Roberts 
is too general to be controlling in this case. Here, in 
effect we have the live testimony recorded in the wiretap 
of a coconspirator, testimony Rule 801 expressly says is -------------admissible. Respondent's implicit answer is that 
statements "admissible under Rule 801 (D) (2) (E) are often 
without any hint of reliability", and that the rule would 
allow admission despite the fact that they contained 
falsehoods." 
7. 
More significantly, respondent's brief observes that: 
"Former testimony, although given under 
oath, in the presence of the defendant, and in 
fact subjected to cross-examination, is not 
admissible unless the government demonstrates 
that its admission is necessary because of the 
1declarant is unavailable. There is no 
justification for the government's assertion 
that coconspirator declarations - not made under 
oath, and often not made in the presence of the 
defendant, and never subject to cross-
examination, are not governed by the same clear 
rule". Br. p. 8. 
I must reread, and do so carefully, the SG's brief. 
1 am not sure 1 understand the rationale of his 
distinction between testimony given under oath and subject 
ff..a_/-
to cross-examination at a prior trial is subject to the 
:'\ 
Confrontation Clause, whereas under the Coconspirator Rule 
the unsworn conversation of the defendant with 
coconspirators is not subject to Confrontation Clause. In 
view of the exigency of the government as to the effect of 
CA3's decision, 1 would like for my clerk to help me 
better understand the government's rationale, and whether 
it supports the validity of Rule 801 in the circumstances 
of this case. 









Justice Powell November 27 1 1985 
From: Bill 
Re: United States v. Inadi1 No. 84-1580 
Cert to CA3 
Argument date: Dec. 31 1985 
Question Presented 
Does the Confrontation Clause require 1 as a prerequisite 
to admission of co-conspirator statements 1 a showing that the 
declarant is unavailable to testify at trial? 
Statement of Facts 
Your memo to the file in this case contains a good factual 




In this case, CA3 decided that Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 
56 (1980) requires a showing of unavailability as a prerequisite 
to introduction of @out-of-court declaration offered for its 
truth, save when the declaration is so obviously reliable that 
cross-examination would serve no purpose. CA3's holding is 
certainly defensible, given the Court's sweeping language in 
~berts. But at least in my view, CA3's holding applies Roberts' 
literal formula without reference to its purpose, and thereby 
reaches a silly result. 
~
Because I don't think that result is 
compelled by Roberts, I recommend that you vote to reverse. 
My analysis does not turn on the parties' arguments about 
~e history of the right of confrontation. It seems to me that 
this is an especially bad case in which to rely on history as a -primary guide. To the legal systems of 17th and 18th century 
~
England and 18th and 19th century America, large-scale criminal 
conspiracies--especially of the sort commonly found today in drug 
cases--were rare. (Hence the very small number of co-conspirator 
statement cases that arose in the 19th century. See Brief for 
Petr at 34-35 (citing cases).) Moreover, wiretaps were of course 
nonexistent. It seems senseless to decide cases like this one ------
based on historical patterns that didn't include cases like this 
one. 









The question in Roberts was whether the ' state could 
introduce the defendant's daughter's sworn testimony from the 
--------------------defendant's preliminary hearing. The Court (per Justice 
Blackmun) used these facts to expound at length on the general 
~eery of the Confrontation Clause. The critical language bears 
quoting in full, since resolution of this case turns on how one 
reads it: 
J-t/t~ 
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate 
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. 
First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for 
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth amendment 
establishes a rule of necessity. In the /usual cas€1 
(including cases- wn ere prlror cross-examinat i on has 
occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose 
statement it wishes to use against the defendant. See 
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408' u.s. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 
390 u.s. 719 (1968). See also Motes v. United States, 
178 u.s. 458 (1900); California v. Green, 399 u.s., at 
161-162, 165, 167, n. 16. [The Court then discussed 
the Confrontation Clause's requirement that out-of-
court declarations offered for their truth have some 
indicia of trustworthiness.] 
448 u.s., at 65. One can certainly read this paragraph (as CA3 ---------------------------- ___. 
did) 1 but the rare case the government must 
show unavailability as a prerequisite to introducing hearsay. ___________.. 
But the language doesn't have to be read that way. The Court 
said that the unavailability requirement applies "in the usual 
case," not in all cases. Equally important, at the end of that 
~------------~ 
paragraph the Court dropped a footnote stating that "[a] ~S" -
demonstration of unavailabiity 
--~. --- -----------------
hedges undermine any argument 
is not always required." The~  
that the Court was adopting a 
definitive rule for all kinds of hearsay. 
The limits on the unavailability ~equirement: become more 
clear when one looks at the purpose of the requirement and the 
factual circumstances in which it has been imposed. Roberts says 
that the requirement stems from "the Framers' preference for 
face-to-face accusation." Ibid. Such a preference logically 
mplies that when the government has a choice between using out-
of-court statements and live testimony, it should use the latter, 
in order to permit the defendant to test the evidence by cross-
examination. Thus, in Roberts, the government had to show 
unavailability in order to use defendant's daughter's prior 
recorded testimony. Similarly, in each of the four cases Robert:~~ 
cites to support the unavailability requirement, the government ~ 
c~ 
oought to use prior recorded testimony in place of liv 
------------------~~-------~------testimony. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra: Barber v. Page, supra; 
california v. Green, supra; Motes v. United States, supra. The 
logic of these results seems clear. The government has no valid 
reason to prefer prior recorded testimony over live testimony, 
while the defendant has every reason to prefer live testimony (so 
he can cross-examine). 
This isn't the case with most kinds of hearsay, including 
co-conspirator statements of the sort involved here. 1 Part of 
,. 
1 Technically, the Federal Rules of Evidence classify co-
conspirator statements as non- e . Evid. 
801 .( e p rt1es e no 1nvested any importance in 
this fact, and properly so. Like other out-of-court 
statements that are treated as "hearsay" for Confrontation 
Clause purposes, co-conspirator statements are out-of-
court statements offered for their truth. Cf. Tennessee 
v. Street, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 (1985) (out-of-court 
statements not offered as "substantive evidence" do not 
(Footnote continued) 
the evidentiary value of co-conspirator, statemen'ts--and most 
other kinds of admissible hearsay--stems from the context in 
which they are made. The point is perhaps best seen by reference 
iL \~ 
to another standard hearsay exception: excited utterances. An 
excited utterance is persuasive evidence not simply because of 
its content, but because the speaker was agitated, and therefore 
not likely to utter a calculated falsehood. If part of the 
government's evidence in a criminal case was an excited 
utterance, the government would not discard that evidence if the 
declarant took the stand, because the declarant's live testimony 
is not a substitute for the out-of-court declaration. The live 
testimony, in other words, lacks the evidentiary significance of 
the out-of-court statement's context. It therefore makes no 
sense to tell the government that the Confrontation Clause 
"prefers" live testimony to an excited utterance: 
not interchangeable pieces of evidence. 2 
the two are 
The defendant may, of course, wish to cross-examine the 
declarant about the out-of-court statement. But the defendant is 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
raise Confrontation Clause concerns) . I see no reason why 
the Constitution should treat co-conspirator statements 
differently because of their classification in the Federal~ 
Rules. 
( 
2 The point applies as well to co-conspirator statements. 
When the government offers the statement of one drug 
dealer to another in furtherance of a common (illegal) 
scheme, the statement is likely to derive its significance 
from the circumstances in which it was made. Conspirators 
presumably speak differently when talking to each other in 
furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on 
the witness stand. Their motivation in the former 
circumstance may be an important corroborative tool for 
evaluating their statements. 
6. 
and the Sixth Amendment's 
Cbmpulsory Process Clause guarantees that the government will 
make some effort to obtain the witness' presence. 3 LaFa 
Israel, Criminal Procedure §23. 3 (e) : see also Rovar io v. Un 
States, 353 u.s. 53 (1957). That is all that the government 
do under the unavailability requirement anyway. See Robe 
rupra, at 75 (declarant found "unavailable" because she 
traveling and could not be reached by phone). 
The correctness of this analysis is confirmed by a look at 
the results of CA3's decision. Under CA3's approach, the 
government would have to produce the declarant if it could, ~ 
if neither the government nor the defendant wanted to question 
the declarant. Under the approach I've just outlined, the 
government would only have to produce the declarant if live 
testimony is a substitute for the out-of-c~urt declaration. 
Otherwise, the defendant is free to invoke the court's processes 
to obtain his presence. 
I have two e nothing in this (f/"3 
analysis affects 
Clause requires 
b d . . h h ~~ Ro erts' eterm1nat1on t at t e Confronta
that hearsay have s~ia ~ 
Reliability is simply not at issue in this trustworthiness. 
~
case, since CA3's decision was 
unavailability prong of Roberts. 
reached solely on the 
~, the approach I've 
suggested is much more compatible with Dutton v. Evans, 400 u.s. 
74 (1970) than is CA3's approach. In Dutton, the Court held that 
the admission of a co-conspirator statement (under a state 
evidence rule different in some respects from the federal rule) 
did not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights, 
notwithstanding that the government did not show una'vailabili ty. 
The out-of-court statement in Dutton was a co-conspirator's 
statement to a third party that "if it hadn't been for that dirty 
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans [the defendant], we wouldn't be in this 
now." 400 u.s., at 77. It seems clear that the defendant might 
have cross-examined his co-conspirator about this statement, and 
could conceivably have elicited some innocent explanation for the 
statement. 3 But whether or not the declarant was called to the 
witness stand, the out-of-court statement in Dutton was valuable 
evidence because of its context, as the Dutton plurality 
expressly recognized. 400 u.s., at 89 (op. of Stewart, J., 
joined by the Chief Justice, ~ustice White, and Justice 
Blackmun). 4 Thus, there was no reason to condition its admission 
on a showing that the declarant could not giv~ live testimony. 
Conclusion 
The Court should reverse CA3 Is decision in this case. ('}vO r \ 
/~ 
Where an out-of-court statement and live testimony are fungible, ~~A~ 
'--------~ ~~ 
3 But see Roberts, supra, at 65 n. 7 (distinguishing 
r:.utton as a case in which "the utility of trial 
confrontation [was] so remote that [the Court] did not 
require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available 
witness"). 1 concede that my analysis is in tension with 
the language of Roberts' footnote 7. 
\\ 
4 The fifth and deciding vote in Dutton was Justice 
Harlan, in whose view the Confrontation Clause did not in 
any way limit the use of hearsay in criminal trials. 400 
u.s., at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
as with prior recorded testimony, the government should be 
required to produce the live witness if it can. But where the 
out-of-court statement is offered not simply for its content but ,......_.__ _________ ___..,.____ 
also for the context in which it was made, an unavailability 
~ -----~--~----'-------~--------requirement is senseless. The defendant can, if he wishes, 
subpoena the declarant to testify. If the defendant does not 
subpoena the declarant, he has nothing to complain about when the 
government offers the declaration. 
'• 
. . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1580 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the Confrontation 
Clause requires the government to show that a non-testifying 
co-conspirator is unavailable to testify, as a condition for ad-
mission of that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements. 
I 
Following a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, respondent Joseph Inadi was convicted of conspiring to 
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, and related 
offenses. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment to 
be followed by a seven-year parole term. The evidence at 
·trial showed that in September 1979, respondent was ap-
proached by unindicted co-conspirator Michael McKeon, who 
was seeking a distribution outlet for methamphetamine. 
Respondent's role was to supply cash and chemicals for the 
manufacture of methamphetamine and to be responsible for 
its distribution. McKeon and another unindicted co-conspir-
ator, William Levan, were to manufacture the substance. 
In the course of manufacturing and selling methamphet-
amine, McKeon, Levan, and respondent met with another 
unindicted co-conspirator, John Lazaro, at an empty house in 
Cape May, New Jersey. There they extracted additional 
methamphetamine from the liquid residue of previous 
batches. In the early morning hours of May 23, 1980, two 
Cape May police officers, pursuant to a warrant, secretly en-
84-1580--0PINION 
2 UNITED STATES v. INADI 
tered the house and removed a tray covered with drying 
methamphetamine. With the permission of the issuing mag-
istrate, the officers delayed returning an inventory, leaving 
the participants to speculate over what had happened to the 
missing tray. 
On May 25, 1980, two DEA agents in Philadelphia moni-
tored a meeting between respondent and Lazaro alongside 
Lazaro's car. At one point one of the agents saw respondent 
lean into the car. After Lazaro drove off, the agents 
stopped his car. They searched the car, Lazaro, and a pas-
senger, Marianne Lazaro, but they found nothing and let the 
Lazaros leave. Marianne Lazaro later recounted that during 
the search she threw away a clear plastic bag containing 
white powder that her husband had handed to her after the 
meeting with respondent. Eight hours after the search, one 
of the agents returned to the scene of the crime and found a 
clear plastic bag containing a small quantity of 
methamphetamine. 
From May 23 to May 27, 1980, the Cape May County Pros-
ecutor's Office lawfully intercepted and recorded five tele-
phone conversations between various participants in the con-
spiracy. These taped conversations were played for the jury 
at trial. The conversations dealt with various aspects of the 
conspiracy, including planned meetings and speculation about 
who had taken the missing tray from the house and who had 
set Lazaro up for the May 25 stop and search. Respondent 
sought to exclude the recorded statements of Lazaro and the 
other unindicted co-conspirators on the ground that the state-
ments did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), governing admission of co-conspirator 
declarations. 1 After listening to the tapes the trial court ad-
mitted the statements, finding that they were made by con-
1 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not · 
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by a co-conspir-
ator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 
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spirators during the course of and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, and thereby satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
Respondent also objected to admission of the statements 
on Confrontation Clause grounds, contending that the state-
ments were inadmissible absent a showing that the declar-
ants were unavailable. The court suggested that the pros-
ecutor bring Lazaro to court in order to demonstrate 
unavailability. The court also asked defense counsel 
whether she wanted the prosecution to call Lazaro as a wit-
ness, and defense counsel stated that she would discuss the 
matter with her client. The co-conspirators' statements 
were admitted, conditioned on the prosecution's commitment 
to produce Lazaro. The government subpoenaed Lazaro, 
but he failed to appear, claiming car trouble. The record 
does not indicate that the defense made any effort on its own 
part to secure Lazaro's presence in court. 
Respondent renewed his Confrontation Clause objections, 
arguing that the government had not met its burden of show-
ing that Lazaro was unavailable to testify. The trial court 
overruled the objection, ruling that Lazaro's statements 
were admissible because they satisfied the co-conspirator 
rule. 2 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The 
court agreed that the government had satisfied Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), but decided that the Confrontation Clause es-
tablished an independent requirement that the government, 
as a condition to admission of any out-of-court statements, 
must show the unavailability of the declarant. United States 
v. Inadi, 748 F. 2d 812, 818 (CA3 1984). The court derived 
this "unavailability rule" from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 
(1980). The Court of Appeals rejected the government's 
contention that Roberts did not require a showing of unavail-
2 The trial court also noted that two of the four co-conspirator declarants 
(Mrs. Lazaro and McKeon) had testified and that a third (Levan) was un-
available because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege outside 
the presence of the jury. 
• Y 
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ability as to a non-testifying co-conspirator, finding that Rob-
erts created a "clear constitutional rule" applicable to out-of-
court statements generally. 748 F. 2d, at 818. The court 
found no reason to create a special exception for co-conspir-
ator statements, and therefore ruled Lazaro's statements in-
admissible. Inadi, supra, 818-819. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --, (1985) to resolve 
the question whether the Confrontation Clause requires a 
showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the 
out-of-court statements of a non-testifying co-conspirator, 
when those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 3 We now reverse. 
II 
A 
The Court of Appeals derived its rule that the government 
must demonstrate unavailability from our decision in Rob-
erts. It quoted Roberts as holding that "in conformance with 
the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth 
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual 
case . . . the prosecution must either produce, or demon-
strate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it 
wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U. S., at 65. The 
Court of Appeals viewed this language as setting forth a 
"clear constitutional rule" applicable before any hearsay can 
be admitted. 748 F. 2d, at 818. Under this interpretation 
of Roberts, no out-of-court statement would be admissible 
without a showing of unavailability. 
Roberts, however, does not stand for such a wholesale revi-
sion of the law of evidence, nor does it support such a broad 
3 The reliability of the out-of-court statements is not at issue in this 
case. The Court of Appeals determined that whether or not the state-
ments are reliable, their admission violated the Sixth Amendment because 
the government did not show that the declarant was unavailable to testify. 
748 F . 2d, at 818-819. The sole issue before the Court is whether that 
decision is correct . 
T , ... • 
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Roberts itself 
disclaimed any intention of proposing a general answer to the 
many difficult questions arising out of the relationship be-
tween the Confrontation Clause and hearsay. "The Court 
has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation 
. Clause that would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay 
"exceptions.""' 448 U. S., at 65, quoting California v. 
Green, 399 U. S. 149, 162 (1970). The Court in Roberts re-
mained "[c]onvinced that 'no rule will perfectly resolve all 
possible problems'" and rejected the "invitation to overrule a 
near-century of jurisprudence" in order to create such a rule. 
448 U. S., at 68 n. 9, quoting Natali, Green, Dutton, and 
Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 Rutgers-
Camden L. J. 43, 73 (1975). In addition, the Court specifi-
cally noted that a "demonstration of unavailability ... is not 
always required." !d., at 65 n. 7. In light of these limiting 
statements, Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer 
to questions not presented in that case, but rather as a reso-· 
lution of the issue the Court said it was examining: "the con-
stitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at 
the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial." ld., at 58. 4 
The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on 
those factors that come into play when the prosecution seeks 
to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of 
live testimony at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). In 
'Roberts involved a state criminal trial on charges of forging a check in 
the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possession of stolen credit cards belong-
ing to Issacs and his wife. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel 
called the Isaacs' daughter as a witness. She testified that she had per-
mitted the defendant to use the apartment for several days, but she re-
fused to admit that she had given the defendant the checks or credit cards. 
Between the preliminary hearing and the trial, through no fault of the 
state, she disappeared. At trial, the defendant testified that the Isaac's 
daughter had given him the checks and credit cards to use. The state 
sought to offer the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in re-
buttal. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 58-60 (1980). 
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particular, the Roberts Court examined the requirement, 
found in a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving 
prior testimony, that before such statements can be admitted 
the government must demonstrate that the declarant is un-
available. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972); 
California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 
390 U. S. 719 (1969); Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314 
(1969). 5 All of the cases cited in Roberts for this "unavail-
ability rule" concern prior testimony. In particular, the 
Court focused on two cases, Barber and Mancusi, that di-
rectly "explored the issue of constitutional unavailability." 
448 U. S., at 76. Both cases specifically limited the unavail-
ability exception to prior testimony. Barber, supra, at 722; 
Mancusi, supra, at 211. 
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it an-
swered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these 
indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule, 
foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), es-
tablished in Barber, and refined in a line of cases up through 
Roberts, that applies unavailability analysis to prior testi-
mony. 6 Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical 
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced 
by the government without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable. 
B 
There are good reasons why the unavailability rule, devel-
oped in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to 
co-conspirators' out-of-court statements. Unlike some other 
5 Fed. R. Evid. 804 also imposes an unavailability requirement before 
allowing the admission of prior testimony. The Rule 804 requirement is 
part of the law of evidence regarding hearsay. While it "may readily be 
conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally de-
signed to protect similar values," California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 155 
(1970), the overlap is not complete. 
6 In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was 
established long before Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), in Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895). 
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exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the · exemption from the 
hearsay definition involved in this case, former testimony 
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It sel-
dom has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but 
is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is 
available and the same information can be presented to the 
trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-
examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the 
declarant, there is little justification for relying on the 
weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence 
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, 
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the 
better evidence. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation 
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 143 (1972). But if the declarant is 
unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence exists, and 
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live 
testimony on the same point. 
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator state-
ments. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in 
progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspira-
cy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant 
testifies to the same matters in court. When the govern-
ment-as here-offers the statement of one drug dealer to 
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement 
often will derive its significance from the circumstances in 
which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak 
differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their 
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand. 
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testi-
mony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evi-
dentiary value of his statements during the course of the 
conspiracy. 
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have 
changed substantially between the time of the statements 
and the trial. The declarant and the defendant will have 
84-1580-0PINION 
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changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or 
defendants in a criminal trial, each with information poten-
tially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be 
facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive 
to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming 
to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation, 
it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture 
the evidentiary significance of statements made when the 
conspiracy was operating in full force. 
These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from 
the statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testi-
mony cases. Those cases rested in part on the strong simi-
larities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial. 
No such strong similarities exist between co-conspirator 
statements and live testimony at trial. To the contrary, co-
conspirator statements derive much of their value from the 
fact that they are made in a context very different from trial, 
and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evi-
dence. Under these circumstances, "only clear folly would 
dictate an across the board policy of doing without" such 
statements. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note on 
the Hearsay Problem, quoted in Westen, The Future of Con-
frontation, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1193 (1979). The admis-
sion of co-conspirators' declarations into evidence thus actu-
ally furthers the "Confrontation Clause's very mission" which 
is to "advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process 
in criminal trials."' Tennessee v. Street, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 
2082 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 
(1970). 
c 
There appears to be little, if any, benefit to be accom-
plished by the Court of Appeals' unavailability rule. First, if 
the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and pro-
duced by the prosecution, the statements can be introduced 
anyway. Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as 
a constitutional "better evidence" rule, because it does not 
84-158~PINION 
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actually serv'e to exclude anything, unless the prosecution 
makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available 
witness. Cf. Westen, supra; Davenport, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Pros-
ecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 
1403 (1972). In this case, for example, out-of-court state-
ments by Michael McKeon and Marianne Lazaro, who testi-
fied under immunity, could be introduced based on their tes-
timony in court. The statements of William Levan were 
admissible because he properly asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege and thereby was unavailable. 
Second, an unavailability rule is not likely to produce much 
testimony that adds anything to the "truth-determining proc-
ess" over and above what would be produced without such a 
rule. Dutton, supra, at 89. Some of the available declar-
ants already will have been subpoenaed by the prosecution or 
the defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause require-
ments. Presumably only those declarants that neither side 
believes will be particularly helpful will not have been sub-
poenaed as witnesses. There is much to indicate that Lazaro 
was in that position in this case. Neither the government 
nor the defense originally subpoenaed Lazaro as a witness. 7 
When he subsequently failed to show, alleging car trouble, 
respondent did nothing to secure his testimony. If respond-
ent independently wanted to secure Lazaro's testimony, he 
had several options available, particularly under Fed. R. 
Evid. 806,8 which provides that if the party against whom a 
7 In fact, the actions of the parties in this case demonstrate what is no 
doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cases-neither side wants a co-
conspirator as a witness. As explained supra, at -, the interests of the 
prosecution and the co-conspirator seldom will run together. Nor do the 
co-conspirator's interests coincide with his former partners, since each is in 
a position that is potentially harmful to the others. 
8 Rule 806 states: 
''When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), 
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the 
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evi-
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co-conspirator statement has been admitted calls the declar-
ant as a witness, "the party is entitled to examine him on the 
statement as if under cross-examination." Rule 806 would 
not require respondent to make the showing necessary to 
have Lazaro declared a hostile witness, although presumably 
that option also was available to him. The Compulsory Proc-
ess Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the tes-
timony of any of these declarants. 9 If the government has 
no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant as a witness, and if 
the defense has not chosen to subpoena such a declarant, 
either as a witness favorable to the defense, or as a hostile 
witness, or for cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid. 806, 10 
then it is difficult to see what, if anything, is gained by a rule 
that requires the prosecution to make that declarant 
"available." 11 
dence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testi-
fied as a witness. . . . If the party against whom a hearsay statement has 
been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to ex-
amine him on the statement as if under cross-examination." 
9 U. S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor .... " Cf. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory 
Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 567, 586-601 (1978). 
10 It is not clear from the Court of Appeals' opinion wheth5 in order to 
meet its burden of showing unavailability, the prosecutiOJ)I would be re-
quired to call the declarant as a witness, or only to ensure that the declar-
ant is available for testimony if needed. The unavailability rule suffers 
from many of the same flaws under either interpretation, and in fact may 
be even less defensible under an interpretation requiring the prosecution 
to call each declarant as a witness. 
11 In addition to the reasons mentioned in the text why an unavailability 
rule would be of little value, many co-conspirator statements are not intro-
duced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and thus do not come 
within the traditional definition of hearsay, even without the special ex-
emption of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, some of the out-of-court 
statements in this case presumably could be admitted without implicating 
the Confrontation Clause. For example, in one of the recorded phone con-
versations Levan and Lazaro discuss the missing tray with Lazaro sug-
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While the benefits seem slight, the burden imposed by the 
Court of Appeals' unavailability rule is significant. A con-
stitutional rule requiring a determination of availability 
every time the prosecution seeks to introduce a co-conspir-
ator's declaration automatically adds another avenue of ap-
pellate review in these complex cases. The co-conspirator 
rule apparently is the most frequently used exception to the 
hearsay rule. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evi-
dence § 427, at 331 (1980). 12 A rule that required each invo-
cation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to be accompanied by a decision on 
the declarant's availability would impose a substantial burden 
on the entire criminal justice system. 
Moreover, an unavailability rule places a significant practi-
cal burden on the prosecution. In every case involving co-
conspirator statements, the prosecution would be required to 
identify with specificity each declarant, locate those declar-
ants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availabil-
ity for trial. Where declarants are incarcerated there is the 
burden on prison officials and marshals of transporting them 
to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased risk of 
escape. For unincarcerated declarants the unavailability 
rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy period 
before trial the government must endeavor to be aware of the 
whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court deter-
mination that its efforts to produce the declarant did not sat-
gesting that "Mike" took it and speculating about who set Lazaro up for the 
May 25 stop. Inadi, supra, 748 F. 2d at 815. Certainly these statements 
were not introduced in order to prove the truth of the matters asserted, 
but as background for the conspiracy, or to explain the significance of cer-
tain events. We explained just last Term that admission of non-hearsay 
"raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Tennessee v. Street, supra, at 
2081. Cross-examination regarding such statements would contribute 
nothing to Confrontation Clause interests. 
12 Fed. R. Evid. 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by co-conspir-
ators as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the hearsay rule. 
Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions is not rele-
vant to Confrontation Clause analysis. 
•· 
84-1580--0PINION 
12 UNITED STATES v. INADI 
isfy the test of "good faith." See Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 
74-77; id., at 77-82 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Ordonez, 737 F. 2d 793, 802 (CA9 1984). 13 
An unavailability rule would impose all of these burdens 
even if neither the prosecution nor the defense wished to ex-
amine the declarant at trial. Any marginal protection to the 
defendant by forcing the government to call as witnesses 
those co-conspirator declarants who are available, willing to 
testify, hostile to the defense and yet not already subpoenaed 
by the prosecution, when the defendant himself can call and 
cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavail-
ability rule. We hold today that the Confrontation Clause 
does not embody such a rule. 
III 
To some degree, respondent's arguments in this case re-
quire us to revisit this Court's resolution of this question in 
Dutton, supra, 400 U. S. 74 (1970). Although Dutton in-
volved a state co-conspirator rule instead of Fed. -R. Evid. 
801, the state rule actually admitted a broader category of co-
conspirator statements. Nevertheless, a plurality of this 
Court found that the rule did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause and a fifth member of the Court, Justice Harlan, rea-
soned that the Confrontation Clause was not applicable at all. 
In Dutton the Court stated that "we do not question the va-
lidity of the co-conspirator exception applied in the federal 
courts." Dutton, supra, at 80. Upon closer examination 
today, we continue to affirm the validity of the use of co-con-
spirator statements, and we decline to require a showing of 
the declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to their 
admission. 
18 The court in Ordonez, supra, found a Confrontation Clause violation 
because the government, after introducing drug ledgers containing entries 
made by unidentified co-conspirators, did not adequately demonstrate that 
it was totally unable to identify those conspirators. 
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We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
j;u.prtmt (!fttud llf tqt ~tb j;tatts 
'Bas1yingtttn.l8. <!f. 2!l.;iJ!.~ , 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 24, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1580-U.S. v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis: 






cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.ittpTtmt ato:u:rt o:f tlft ~tb .itatt.&' 
~Jringhtn. ~. ar. 2ll&rJ!.$ 
JUSTI CE BYRON R . WH ITE 
January 27, 1986 
84-1580 - United States v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
... 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
.:§nprmtt <!ftturlttf tlrt ~~ ;§taft$' 
~~· ~·~ 2n~~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WH ITE January 27, 1986 
84-1580 - United States v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P.S.: I could get along without you;\ 
footnote 12. ) 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iuvrtmt Qt1t1td ttf tqt 1ltnittb .itatt.&' 
Jlufriu:gtttn, ~. Qt. 2llp~.;l . 
January 27, 1986 
No. 84-1580 United States v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUJST 
~u.prmtt Qiltllriltf tltt ,-mttb ~tz:thg 
.. ulfittghttt. ~. ar. 2Llp~~ 
January 27, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1580 United States v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
i'u.p:rnnt <!fouri ltf tqt ~ttlt i'bdts 
Jfufringhtn.lO. <!f. 2llp~~ 
January 28, 1986 









..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~~ <!Jourl o-f tltt 'Jitttitt~ ~hdtg 
._a.slfingtcn. ~. <!J. 2ll.;t~$ 
Re: No. 84-1580, United States v. Inadi 
Dear Lewis: 
January 31, 1986 


















dv ~ 4'9 
~~- ~~) 
From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: FEB 14 .J986 
~\ Y~<:RAFT 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
vJ 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1580 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
With respect to the case before us, the majority takes but a 
small step. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), the 
Court held: "When a hearsay decladnt is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally 
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his 
statement is admissible only it it bears adequate 'indicia of 
reliability."' ld., at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 
74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion)). The majority now assures 
us that "[t]he reliability of the out-of-court statements is not 
at issue in this case." Ante, at--, n. 3. Respondent is 
thus free to return to the Court of Appeals and argue that the 
co-conspirator declarations admitted against him lack the "in-
dicia of reliability'' demanded by the Confrontation Clause. 1 
1 Today's decision does nothing to resolve the conflict among the lower 
courts as to whether declarations of co-conspirators who are not present in 
court for cross-examiniation must be shown to have particularized "indicia 
of reliability'' before they can be admitted for substantive purposes against 
a criminal defendant. Compare United States v. DeLuna, 763 F. 2d 897 
(CAB 1985) (particularized inquiry into reliability of co-conspirator state-
ments demanded in addition to unavailability requirement); United States 
v. Ordonez, 722 F. 2d 530, 535 (CA9 1983) (particularized assessment of 
reliability needed for every statement admitted under co-conspirator hear-
say exemption); United States v. Perez, 702 F. 2d 33 (CA2) (same), cert. 
denied, 462 U. S. 1108 (1983), with Boone v. Marshall, 760 F. 2d 117, 119 
(CA6 1985) (declaration admitted under co-conspirator exemption "auto-
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With respect to its constitutional analysis, however, the 
majority makes a giant leap. Even while conceding that the 
"very mission" of the Confrontation Clause is to "'advance 
"the accuracy of the truth determining process in criminal tri-
als,""' id., at--, the Court today holds that the Clause is 
not offended when the prosecution fails to make even the 
slightest effort to produce for cross-examination the authors 
of the out-of-court statements with which it hopes to convict 
a defendant. Because I cannot share the majority's implicit 
faith that the camaraderie of a criminal conspiracy can substi- 'JttJt, 
tute for in-court cross-examination to guarantee the reliabil- x;-
ity of conspiratorial statements, I can neither accept the ma-
jority's analysis nor stand silent while the values embodied in 




In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, after canvassing the many pre-
vious cases that had examined the relationship between the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the many 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Court noted: 
"The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate 
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, 
in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-
face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule 
of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where 
prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution 
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability 
of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use 
against the defendant. . . . 
v. Molt, 758 F. 2d 1198 (CA7 1985) (same); Ottomano v. United States, 468 
F. 2d 269, 273 (CA11972) (same), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1128 (1973). See 
Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and 
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"The second aspect operates once a witness is shown 
to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to 
augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring 
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evi-
dence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked 
with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material de-
parture from the reason of the general rule.'" I d., at 66 
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 107 
(1934)). 
This sweeping language was in no way limited to any par-
ticular variety of out-of-court declarations, and the Third Cir-
cuit panel that the Court reverses today was hardly alone in 
believing the rule in Roberts to be applicable to all such dec-
larations. See, e. g., United States v. Massa, 740 F. 2d 629, 
639 (CAB 1984); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F. 2d 1050, 1055 
(CA6 1983), cert denied, 464 U. S. 1071 (1984); see also 
United States v. Caputo, 758 F. 2d 944, 950, n. 2 (CA3 1985) 
(collecting cases). The majority, however, now tells us that 
Roberts "simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule ... that ap-
plies unavailability analysis to prior testimony." Ante, at 
--. This effort to confine Roberts misconstrues both the 
meaning of that decision and the essential command of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, it is clear that the 
Roberts Court consciously sought to lay down an analytical 
framework applicable to all out-of-court declarations intro-
duced by the prosecution for the truth they contain. Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, writing for the Court, introduced his af-
firmation of the Confrontation Clause's twin requirements of 
unavailability and reliability by noting: "The Court has not 
sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that 
would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay "excep-
tions."' California v. Green, 399 U. S. [149,] 162 [1970]. 
But a general approach to the problem is discernible." 448 
U. S., at 64-65. For its general principles, the Roberts 
Court of course turned to a number of cases involving former 
' . 
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testimony, e. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968); Motes v. United States, 
178 U. S. 458 (1900); California v. Green, supra, (all cited at 
448 U. S., at 65). But it also relied on Dutton v. Evans, 
supra (cited at 448 U. S., at 65, n. 7, and 66), where the 
hearsay had been admitted pursuant to the Georgia co-con-
spirator exception, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 
(1965) (cited at 448 U. S., at 63), which involved an accom-
plice's confession. Indeed, it was on Douglas that Roberts 
relied for the proposition "that the Confrontation Clause re-
flects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and 
that a 'primary interest served by [the provision] is the right 
of cross-examination."' 448 U. S., at 63 (quoting Douglas, 
supra, at 418). 
The absence of any language in Roberts confining its analy-
sis to prior testimony is not surprising. The Court simply 
recognized that whenever the prosecution seeks to convict a 
defendant by relying on the truth asserted in out-of-court 
declarations, confrontation and cross-examination of the de-
clarant in open court are the most trusted guarantors of the 
reliability that is the primary concern of the Confrontation 
Clause. The need for these guarantors is as critical in cases 
involving the extrajudicial statements of co-conspirators as it 
is in cases involving the prior testimony of an absent declar-
ant or the confession of an accomplice. 
B 
When the prosecution introduces the statements of a co-
conspirator merely to show what the declarant might have 
been thinking or what he wished his listeners to believe at 
the time he spoke, neither the rule against hearsay nor the 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by their admission against 
a defendant. See Tennessee v. Street, supra. However, 
when the prosecution invokes the co-conspirator exemption 
to the hearsay rule, as it does in this case, it is urging the 
truth of the matters asserted in the extrajudicial statements. 
'J 
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The question here must be whether we have so much confi-
dence in the factual accuracy of statements made by conspir-
ators in furtherance of their conspiracy that we deem the 
testing of these statements by cross-examination unnec-
essary to guarantee the reliability of a trial's result. 
The majority is quite right to suggest that "[c]onspirators 
are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in 
furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the 
witness stand." Ante, at--. However, the differences 
between an accomplice's conspiratorial utterances and his 
testimony in court are not merely those of diction and de-
meanor. That a statement was truly made "in furtherance" 
of a conspiracy cannot possibly be a guarantee, or even an in-
dicium, of its reliability. See Davenport, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Pros-
ecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 
1384-1391 (1972); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the Win-
dow of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1291, 1311-1312 (1985). As one commentator has 
noted: 
"Conspirators' declarations are good to prove that some 
conspiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims 
and membership. The conspirator's interest is likely to 
lie in misleading the listener into believing the conspir-
acy stronger with more members (and different mem-
bers) and other aims than in fact it has. It is no victory 
for common sense to make a belief that criminals are 
noted for their veracity the basis for law." Levie, Hear-
say and Conspiracy, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1165-1166 
(1954). 
The unreliability of co-conspirator declarations as trial evi-
dence is not merely a product of the duplicity with which 
criminals often conduct their business. It also stems from 
the ambiguities that so often appear in all casual conversa-
tions, not just those of outlaws. See, e. g., Dutton v. Evans, 
I,, 
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at 104 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). And the difficulties one 
has in making sense of slang and dialect can be compounded 
where conspirators use private codes, as indeed they did in 
this case. Because of these problems, trained case agents 
are often hard pressed to piece together the facts of a crimi-
' nal conspiracy from the confused tangle of conversations they 
have intercepted. The appearance of a co-conspirator de-
clarant in court will allow the elimination of ambiguity that 
neither side has a right to profit from. 
c 
Consideration of the reasons why co-conspirator declara-
tions have been exempted from the rule against hearsay only 
confirms doubts as to the reliability of the truth asserted in 
those statements. In contrast to other types of statements 
excepted from the rule, the co-conspirator declarations have 
not been admitted because of a belief in their special reliabil-
ity. See Davenport, supra, at 1384-1385; Levie, supra, at 
1161-1167. Rather, the root of the exemption lies in sub-
stantive law. Under the agency theory that supports con-
spiracy law, "once the conspiracy or combination is estab-
lished, the act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the 
enterprise, is considered the act of all, and is evidence 
against all." United States v. Gooding, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 
460, 469 (1827). Every statement of co-conspirators in fur-
therance of their illegal scheme is thus a verbal act admissible 
against each conspirator as if it had been his own. 
This agency theory, which even the Advisory Committee 
on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence labelled "at best a 
fiction," Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note, 
might justify the exemption conferred upon co-conspirator 
declarations from the traditional rule against hearsay. But 
it speaks not at all to the Confrontation Clause's concern for 
reliable factfinding. 
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II 
Without even attempting to argue that co-conspirator dec-
larations have an inherent reliability that might justify their 
admission at trial when the declarant is not present in court 
for cross-examination, the majority instead supports its hold-
ing by arguing that "it is extremely unlikely that in-court tes-
timony will recapture the evidentiary significance of state-
ments made when the conspiracy was operating in full force." 
Ante, at --. Indeed, the Court asserts, "co-conspirator 
statements derive much of their value from the fact that they 
are made in a context very different from trial, and therefore 
are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence." Ibid. 
I truly cannot understand the majority's fear that a rule re-
quiring the prosecution to do its best to produce a co-conspir-
ator declarant in court would somehow deprive triers of fact 
of valuable evidence. Under this rule, if the prosecution 
could not in all good faith produce the declarant, the extraju-
dicial statements could come in, so long as they could be 
shown to have "adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' Roberts, 
supra, at 66. The majority's fear must therefore stem from 
a notion that if the prosecution is able to produce the declar-
ant in court, his presence will somehow prevent the jury from 
hearing the truth. This conclusion overlooks the critical im-
portance of cross-examination in the truth-seeking process. 
If a declarant takes the stand, his out-of-court statements 
will still be admitted as evidence, so long as they are suffi-
ciently reliable and there are no other grounds for their ex-
clusion. And cross-examination will only enhance their 
value to the jury. The defendant will have a chance to in-
quire into the circumstances under which the statements 
were made and the motives that might have led the declarant 
to color their truth at the time. Cross-examination also may 
force the declarant to clarify ambiguous phrases and coded 
references. If anything he says is inconsistent with his prior 
statement, the declarant will no doubt advance some explana-
tion for the inaccuracy of the extrajudicial statement-"an 
84-158~DISSENT 
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explanation a jury may be expected to understand and take 
into account in deciding which, if either, of the statements 
represents the truth," California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 
159 (1970). Cf. Nelson v. O'Neil 402 U. S. 622, 627-629 
(1971). 
Whether or not a co-conspirator produced in court affirms, 
denies, or qualifies the truth of his out-of-court statement, 
his presence will contribute to the accuracy of the factfinding 
enterprise, the accuracy that is the primary concern of the 
Confrontation Clause. Whatever truth is contained in his 
extrajudicial declarations cannot be lost. It can only be sup-
plemented by additional information of no ·less use to the 
triers of fact. 
III 
Recognizing that there may well be cases in which the 
cross-examination of a co-conspirator declarant is 
indispensible to a defendant's case, the Court reminds us that 
a defendant can always exercise his rights under the Compul-
sory Process Clause and call the declarant as his own wit-
ness. As long as this option remains open to a defendant, 
the Court reasons, "it is difficult to see what, if anything, is 
gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to make that 
declarant 'available."' Ante, at--. However, even as-
suming, as the Court seems to do, that the "good faith stand-
ard governing the state's obligation to produce defense wit-
nesses [pursuant to the Compulsory Process Clause] is 
precisely the same one that governs the state's obligation to 
confront a defendant with the witnesses against him [pursu-
ant to the Confrontation Clause]," Westen, Confrontation 
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for 
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 588 (1978), this is not 
a satisfactory response to respondent's Confrontation Clause 
claim. 
The short answer to the majority's argument is that the 
Confrontation Clause gives a defendant a right to be con-
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tunity to seek out witnesses on his own. As one court once 
noted of a situation similar to that presented in this case: 
"That [a co-conspirator declarant] was available to be 
called as a witness does not mitigate the prosecution's 
misconduct here. The State sought to shift to the de-
fendant the risk of calling [the declarant] to the stand. 
To accept the State's argument that the availability of 
[the declarant] is the equivalent of putting him on the 
stand and subjecting him to cross-examination would se-
verely alter the presumptions of innocence and the bur-
dens of proof which protect the accused." Hoover v. 
Beto, 439 F. 2d 913, 924 (CA5 1971) (Wisdom, J.), rev'd 
on rehearing en bane, 467 F . 2d 516 (CA5)(over dissent 
of seven judges), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1086 (1972). 
See also Dutton v. Evans, supra, at 104 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). 
The disadvantages that the majority would impose upon a 
defendant are not merely theoretical. The Court notes the 
"significant practical burden" placed on the prosecution by a 
requirement that the government identify co-conspirator de-
clarants with specificity. Ante, at--. As an illustration 
of the difficulties that the prosecution would be forced to 
face, the majority refers to United States v. Ordonez, 737 F. 
2d 793 (CA9 1984), where the court found a Confrontation 
Clause violation in the government's failure to identify the in-
dividuals who had made the entries in the "drug ledgers" in-
troduced as evidence against the defendant. Ante, at--, 
n. 13. However, the Court now places this "significant prac-
tical burden" upon the defendant, who may well be in no bet-
ter a position to make such identifications. Even were it 
proper· to assume the defendant's guilt and impute to him 
knowledge regarding pending charges, it can hardly be 
claimed that a defendant who has played but a minor role in a 
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the names and activities of his alleged co-conspirators. 2 
"The prosecution therefore [should have] the burden of pro-
ducing and calling to the witness stand the persons whose 
out-of-court statements it uses against the accused because, 
as between the two sides, the prosecution is in a better posi-
tion to identify them and to initiate their production at that 
time." Westen, supra, at 616. 
Even when a defendant is in as good a position as the pros-
ecution to subpoena available declarants, a rule requiring him 
to call those declarants as his own witnesses may deny the 
defendant certain tactical advantages vouchsafed him by the 
Confrontation Clause. Under the regime established today, 
the only cross-examination that will attend the prosecution's 
introduction of co-conspirator declarations will be of whoever 
heard or recorded those statements and will focus merely on 
whether or not the statements were actually made. Any in-
quiry into the reliability of the statements must await the de-
fendant's case. But if the defendant chooses to call the de-
clarant as a defense witness, defendant risks bolstering in the 
jury's eyes the very conspiracy allegations he wishes to re-
but. That the witness is viewed as hostile by the defendant, 
and has possibly been certified as such by the trial judge, 
does not necessarily mean that his relationship to the defend-
ant will be so perceived by the jury, unless defense counsel 
chooses to dramatize the antagonism with hyperbole that 
might lose him the sympathy of the jury. 
Moreover, even the harshest grilling of a declarant by the 
defense can occur only after the prosecution has rested its 
case. In a complex conspiracy trial, the time elapsing be-
tween the introduction of the hearsay and the cross-examina-
tion of the declarant may be quite substantial. During this 
time, the declarations will be unrebutted in jurors' minds. 
And their effect may actually be enhanced should either the 
2 I realize that this was not the case here. However, the Court's hold-
ing addresses all cases involving co-conspirator declarations and thus ex-
tends to all the hypotheticals I discuss. 
. '· 
84-1580-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES v. INADI 11 
defense or prosecution repeat the statements in the course of 
examining the declarant. In short, "[o]nly a lawyer without 
trial experience would suggest that the limited right to im-
peach one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to im-
mediate cross-examination which has always been regarded 
as the greatest safeguard of American trial procedure." 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 305 (CADC 
1945); see United States v. Oates, 560 F. 2d 45, 82, n. 39 
(CA2 1977). 
In federal prosecutions, there is an additional drawback. 
When a defendant calls a declarant as his own witness, he has 
no statutory right to obtain any prior statements of that de-
clarant in the government's possession-a right that attaches 
only "[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testi-
fied on direct examination," 18 U. S. C. § 3500. 
In view of all the disadvantages that attend a defendant's 
decision to call a co-conspirator declarant as a witness, the 
majority's reliance on the defendant's right to compulsory 
process to justify a decision to deprive him of a critical aspect 
of his Confrontation Clause right cannot be supported. The 
two are simply not equivalent. Moreover, the majority's be-
lief that an unavailability requirement would contribute noth-
ing but a cast of unwanted supernumeraries has no basis in 
the realities of criminal prosecutions. There might be in-
stances in which an available declarant is of so little value to 
either side that calling him as a witness would truly be an un-
necessary exercise. See, e. g., Anderson v. United States, 
417 U. S. 211, 220, n. 11 (1974). But a defendant's failure to 
call a declarant as his own witness can in no way be taken as 
proof that such is the case. 
IV 
At bottom, today's decision rests upon the Court's judg-
ment that a defendant's constitutional interest in subjecting 
the extrajudicial declarations of co-conspirators to the cross-
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tee of reliability in trials must be subordinated to consider-
ations of prosecutorial efficiency. I do . not believe the 
concerns of the Confrontation Clause should be so easily dis-
regarded. The plight of Sir Walter Raleigh, condemned on 
the deposition of an alleged accomplice who had since re-
canted, may have loomed large in the eyes of those who 
drafted that constitutional guarantee. See F. Heller, The 
Sixth Amendment 104 (1951); Stephen, The Trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th 
ser., vol. 2, 172 (1919). But the Framers, had they the pre-
science, would surely have been as apprehensive of the spec-
tacle of a defendant's conviction upon the testimony of a 
handful of surveillance technicians and a very large box of 
tapes recording the boasts, faulty recollections, and coded or 
ambiguous utterances of outlaws. The Court's decision 
helps clear the way for this spectacle to become a common oc-
currence. I dissent. 
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From: Justice Powell 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1580 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the Confrontation 
Clause requires the Government to show that a nontestifying 
co-conspirator is unavailable to testify, as a condition for 
admission of that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements. 
I 
Following a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, respondent Joseph Inadi was convicted of conspiring to 
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, and related 
offenses. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment to 
be followed by a 7-year parole term. The evidence at trial 
showed that in September 1979, respondent was approached 
by unindicted co-conspirator Michael McKeon, who was seek-
ing a distribution outlet for methamphetamine. Respond-
ent's role was to supply cash and chemicals for the manufac-
ture of methamphetamine and to be responsible for its 
distribution. McKeon and another unindicted co-conspira-
tor, William Levan, were to manufacture the substance. 
In the course of manufacturing and selling methamphet-
amine, McKeon, Levan, and respondent met with another 
unindicted co-conspirator, John Lazaro, at an empty house in 
Cape May, New Jersey. There they extracted additional 
methamphetamine from the liquid residue of previous 
batches. In the early morning hours of May 23, 1980, two 
Cape May police officers, pursuant to a warrant, secretly en-
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tered the house and removed a tray covered with drying 
methamphetamine. With the permission of the issuing Mag-
istrate, the officers delayed returning an inventory, leaving 
the participants to speculate over what had happened to the 
missing tray. 
On May 25, 1980, two DEA agents in Philadelphia moni-
tored a meeting between respondent and Lazaro alongside 
Lazaro's car. At one point one of the agents saw respondent 
lean into the car. After Lazaro drove off, the agents 
stopped his car. They searched the car, Lazaro, and a pas-
senger, Marianne Lazaro, but they found nothing and let the 
Lazaros leave. Marianne Lazaro later recounted that during 
the search she threw away a clear plastic bag containing 
white powder that her husband had handed to her after the 
meeting with respondent. Eight hours after the search, one 
of the agents returned to the scene of the crime and found a 
clear plastic bag containing a small quantity of methampheta-
mine. 
From May 23 to May 27, 1980, the Cape May County Pros-
ecutor's Office lawful~~p~d and recorded five tele-
phone conversations between various participants in the con-
spiracy. These taped conversations were played for the jury 
at trial. The conversations dealt with various aspects of the 
conspiracy, including planned meetings and speculation about 
who had taken the missing tray from the house and who had 
set Lazaro up for the May 25 stop and search. Respondent 
sought to exclude the recorded statements of Lazaro and the 
other unindicted co-conspirators on the ground that the state-
ments did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), governing admission of co-conspirator 
declarations.' After listening to the tapes the trial court ad-
mitted the statements, finding that they were made by con-
1 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not 
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by a co-conspir-
ator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 
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spirators during the course of and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, and thereby satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
Respondent also objected to admission of the statements 
on Confrontation Clause grounds, contending that the state-
ments were inadmissible absent a showing that the declar-
ants were unavailable. The court suggested that the pros-
ecutor bring Lazaro to court in order to demonstrate 
unavailability. The court also asked defense counsel 
whether she wanted the prosecution to call Lazaro as a wit-
ness, and defense counsel stated that she would discuss the 
matter with her client. The co-conspirators' statements 
were admitted, conditioned on the prosecution's commitment 
to produce Lazaro. The Government subpoenaed Lazaro, 
but he failed to appear, claiming car trouble. The record 
does not indicate that the defense made any effort on its own 
part to secure Lazaro's presence in court. 
Respondent renewed his Confrontation Clause objections, 
arguing that the Government had not met its burden of show-
ing that Lazaro was unavailable to testify. The trial court 
overruled the objection, ruling that Lazaro's statements 
were admissible because they satisfied the co-conspirator 
rule. 2 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The 
court agreed that the Government had satisfied Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), but decided that the Confrontation Clause es-
tablished an independent requirement that the Government, 
as a condition to admission of any out-of-court statements, 
must show the unavailability of the declarant. United States 
v. Inadi, 748 F. 2d 812, 818 (CA3 1984). The court derived 
this "unavailability rule" from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 
(1980). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's 
contention that Roberts did not require a showing of una vail-
' The trial court also noted that two of the four co-conspirator declarants 
(Mrs. Lazaro and McKeon) had testified and that a third (Levan) was un-
available because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege outside 
the presence of the jury. 
,l 
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ability as to a nontestifying co-conspirator, finding that Rob-
erts created a "clear constitutional rule" applicable to out-of-
court statements generally. 748 F. 2d, at 818. The court 
found no reason to create a special exception for co-conspir-
ator statements, and therefore ruled Lazaro's statements in-
admissible. !d., at 818-819. 
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), to resolve the 
question whether the Confrontation Clause requires a show-
ing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-of-
court statements of a nontestifying co-conspirator, when 
those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). 3 We now reverse. 
II 
A 
The Court of Appeals derived its rule that the Government 
must demonstrate unavailability from our decision in Rob-
erts. It quoted Roberts as holding that "in conformance with 
the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth 
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual 
case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demon-
strate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it 
wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U. S., at 65. The 
Court of Appeals viewed this language as setting forth a 
"clear constitutional rule" applicable before any hearsay can 
be admitted. 748 F. 2d, at 818. Under this interpretation 
of Roberts, no out-of-court statement would be admissible 
without a showing of unavailability. 
Roberts, however, does not stand for such a wholesale revi-
sion of the law of evidence, nor does it support such a broad 
3 The reliability of the out-of-court statements is not at issue in this 
case. The Court of Appeals determined that whether or not the state-
ments are reliable, their admission violated the Sixth Amendment because 
the government did not show that the declarant was unavailable to testify. 
748 F . 2d, at 818-819. The sole issue before the Court is whether that 
decision is correct. 
84-1580-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. INADI 5 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Roberts itself 
disclaimed any intention of proposing a general answer to the 
many difficult questions arising out of the relationship be-
tween the Confrontation Clause and hearsay. "The Court 
has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation 
Clause that would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay 
"exceptions."'" 448 U. S., at 64-65, quoting California v. 
Green, 399 U. S. 149, 162 (1970). The Court in Roberts re-
mained "[c]onvinced that 'no rule will perfectly resolve all 
possible problems'" and rejected the "invitation to overrule a 
near-century of jurisprudence" in order to create such a rule. 
448 U. S., at 68, n. 9, quoting Natali, Green, Dutton, and 
Chambers: Three Cases in Search of .a Theory, 7 Rutgers-
Camden L. J. 43, 73 (1975). In addition, the Court specifi-
cally noted that a "demonstration of unavailability ... is not 
always required." 448 U. S., at 65, n. 7. In light of these 
limiting statements, Roberts should not be read as an ab-
stract answer to questions not presented in that case, but 
rather as a resolution of the issue the Court said it was exam-
ining: "the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evi-
dence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not 
produced at the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial." 
ld., at 58. 4 
The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on 
those factors that come into play when the prosecution seeks 
to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of 
'Roberts involved a state criminal trial on charges of forging a check in 
the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possession of stolen credit cards belong-
ing to Issacs and his wife. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel 
called the Isaacs' daughter as a witness. She testified that she had per-
mitted the defendant to use the apartment for several days, but she re-
fused to admit that she had given the defendant the checks or credit cards. 
Between the preliminary hearing and the trial, through no fault of the 
State, she disappeared. At trial, the defendant testified that the Isaac's 
daughter had given him the checks and credit cards to use. The State 
sought to offer the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in re-
buttal. 448 U. S., at 58-60. 
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live testimony at trial. See Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(1). In 
particular, the Roberts Court examined the requirement, 
found in a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving 
prior testimony, that before such statements can be admitted 
the government must demonstrate that the declarant is un-
available. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972); 
California v. Green, supra; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 
(1968); Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314 (1969). 5 All of 
the cases cited in Roberts for this "unavailability rule" con-
cern prior testimony. In particular, the Court focused on 
two cases, Barber and Mancusi, that directly "explored the 
issue of constitutional unavailability." 448 U. S. , at 76. 
Both cases specifically limited the unavailability exception to 
prior testimony. Barber, supra, at 722; Mancusi, supra, 
at 211. 
Roberts must be r'ead consistently with the question it an-
swered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these 
indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule , 
foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), es-
tablished in Barber, and refined in a line of cases up through 
Roberts, that applies unavailability analysis to prior testi-
mony.6 Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical 
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced 
by the government without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable. 
B 
There are good reasons why the unavailability rule , devel-
oped in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to 
5 Federal Rule of Evidence 804 also imposes an unavailability require-
ment before allowing the admission of prior testimony. The Rule 804 re-
quirement is part of the law of evidence regarding hearsay. While it "may 
readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are 
generally designed to protect similar values ," California v. Green , 399 
U. S. , at 155, the overlap is not complete. 
6 In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was 
established long before Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400 (1965), in Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895). 
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co-conspirators' out-of-court statements. Unlike some other 
exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the exemption from the 
hearsay definition involved in this case, former testimony 
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It sel-
dom has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but 
is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is 
available and the same information can be presented to the 
trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-
examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the 
declarant, there is little justification for relying on the 
weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence 
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, 
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the 
better evidence. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation 
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 143 (1972). But if the declarant is 
unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence exists, and 
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live 
testimony on the same point. 
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator state-
ments. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in 
progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspira-
cy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant 
testifies to the same matters in court. When the Govern-
ment-as here-offers the statement of one drug dealer to 
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement 
often will derive its significance from the circumstances in 
which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak 
differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their 
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand. 
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testi-
mony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evi-
dentiary value of his statements during the course of the 
conspiracy. 
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have 
changed substantially between the time of the statements 
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and the trial. The declarant and the defendant will have 
changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or 
defendants in a criminal trial, each with information poten-
tially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be 
facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive 
to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming 
to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation, 
it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture 
the evidentiary significance of statements made when the 
conspiracy was operating in full force. 
These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from 
the statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testi-
mony cases. Those cases rested in part on the strong simi-
larities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial. 
No such strong similarities exist between co-conspirator 
statements and live testimony at trial. To the contrary, co-
conspirator statements derive much of their value from the 
fact that they are made in a context very different from trial, 
and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evi-
dence. Under these circumstances, "only clear folly would 
dictate an across the board policy of doing without" such 
statements. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note on 
the Hearsay Problem, quoted in Westen, The Future of Con-
frontation, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1193 (1979). The admis-
sion of co-conspirators' declarations into evidence thus actu-
ally furthers the "Confrontation Clause's very mission" which 
is to "advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process 
in criminal trials."' Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. --, 
-- (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 
(1970). 
c 
There appears to be little, if any, benefit to be accom-
plished by the Court of Appeals' unavailability rule. First, if 
the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and pro-
duced by the prosecution, the statements can be introduced 
anyway. Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as 
.. , 
84-158~0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. INADI 9 
a constitutional "better evidence" rule, because it does not 
actually serve to exclude anything, unless the prosecution 
makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available 
witness. Cf. Westen, supra; Davenport, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Pros-
ecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1403 
(1972). In this case, for example, out-of-court statements by 
Michael McKeon and Marianne Lazaro, who testified under 
immunity, could be introduced based on their testimony in 
court. The statements of William Levan were admissible 
because. he properly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege 
and thereby was unavailable. 
Second, an unavailability rule is not likely to produce much 
testimony that adds anything to the "truth-determining proc-
ess" over and above what would be produced without such a 
rule. Dutton, supra, at 89. Some of the available declar-
ants already will have been subpoenaed by the prosecution or 
the defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause require-
ments. Presumably only those declarants that neither side 
believes will be particularly helpful will not have been sub-
poenaed as witnesses. There is much to indicate that Lazaro 
was in that position in this case. Neither the Government 
nor the defense originally subpoenaed Lazaro as a witness. 7 
When he subsequently failed to show, alleging car trouble, 
respondent did nothing to secure his testimony. If respond-
ent independently wanted to secure Lazaro's testimony, he 
had several options available, particularly under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 806, 8 which provides that if the party 
7 In fact, the actions of the parties in this case demonstrate what is no 
doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cases-neither side wants a co-
conspirator as a witness. As explained supra, at-, the interests of the 
prosecution and the co-conspirator seldom will run together. Nor do the 
co-conspirator's interests coincide with his former partners, since each is in 
a position that is potentially harmful to the others. 
8 Rule 806 states: 
"When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), 
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the 
••• t' •. 
84-1580-0PINION 
10 UNITED STATES v. INADI 
against whom a co-conspirator statement has been admitted 
calls the declarant as a witness, "the party is entitled to ex-
amine him on the statement as if under cross-examination." 
Rule 806 would not require respondent to make the showing 
necessary to have Lazaro declared a hostile witness, although 
presumably that option also was available to him. The Com-
pulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in ob-
taining the testimony of any of these declarants. 9 If the 
Government has no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant 
as a witness, and if the defense has not chosen to subpoena 
such a declarant, either as a witness favorable to the defense, 
or as a hostile witness, or for cross-examination under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 806, 10 then it is difficult to see what, if 
anything, is gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to 
make that declarant "available." 11 
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evi-
dence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testi-
fied as a witness. . . . If the party against whom a hearsay statement has 
been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to ex-
amine him on the statement as if under cross-examination." 
9 U. S. Const., Arndt. 6: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor .... " Cf. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A 
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 
586-601 (1978). 
''' It is not clear from the Court of Appeals' opinion whether in order to 
meet its burden of showing unavailability, the prosecution, would be re-
quired to call the declarant as a witness, or only to ensure that the declar-
ant is available for testimony if needed. The unavailability rule suffers 
from many of the same flaws under either interpretation, and in fact may 
be even less defensible under an interpretation requiring the prosecution 
to call each declarant as a witness. 
"In addition to the reasons mentioned in the text why an unavailability 
rule would be of little value, many co-conspirator statements are not intro-
duced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and thus do not come 
within the traditional definition of hearsay, even without the special ex-
emption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, some of the out-
of-court statements in this case presumably could be admitted without im-
plicating the Confrontation Clause. For example, in one of the recorded 
!o' 
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While the benefits seem slight, the burden imposed by the 
Court of Appeals' unavailability rule is significant. A con-
stitutional rule requiring a determination of availability 
every time the prosecution seeks to introduce a co-conspir-
ator's declaration automatically adds another avenue of ap-
pellate review in these complex cases. The co-conspirator 
rule apparently is the most frequently used exception to the 
hearsay rule. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evi-
dence § 427, p. 331 (1980).12 A rule that required each invo-
cation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to be accompanied by a decision on 
the declarant's availability would impose a substantial burden 
on the entire criminal justice system. 
Moreover, an unavailability rule places a significant practi-
cal burden on the prosecution. In every case involving co-
conspirator statements, the prosecution would be required to 
identify with specificity each declarant, locate those declar-
ants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availabil-
ity for trial. Where declarants are incarcerated there is the 
burden on prison officials and marshals of transporting them 
to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased risk of 
escape. For unincarcerated declarants the unavailability 
rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy period 
before trial the Government must endeavor to be aware of 
the whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court 
phone conversations Levan and Lazaro discuss the missing tray with 
Lazaro suggesting that "Mike" took it and speculating about who set 
Lazaro up for the May 25 stop. 748 F. 2d, at 815. Certainly these state-
ments were not introduced in order to prove the truth of the matters as-
serted, but as background for the conspiracy, or to explain the significance 
of certain events. We explained just last Term that admission of non-
hearsay "raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Tennessee v. Street, 
471 U. S. --, -- (1985). Cross-examination regarding such state-
ments would contribute nothing to Confrontation Clause interests. 
12 Federal Rule of Evidence 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by 
co-conspirators as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the hearsay 
rule. Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions, the 
same Confrontation Clause principles apply. 
.. 
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determination that its efforts to produce the declarant did not 
satisfy the test of "good faith." See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U. S., at 74-77; id. , at 77-82 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see 
also United States v. Ordonez, 737 F. 2d 793, 802 (CA9 
1984). 13 
An unavailability rule would impose all of these burdens 
even if neither the prosecution nor the defense wished to ex-
amine the declarant at trial. Any marginal protection to the 
defendant by forcing the government to call as witnesses 
those co-conspirator declarants who are available, willing to 
testify, hostile to the defense and yet not already subpoenaed 
by the prosecution, when the defendant himself can call and 
cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavail-
ability rule. We hold today that the Confrontation Clause 
does not embody such a rule. 
III 
To some degree, respondent's arguments in this case re-
quire us to revisit this Court's resolution of this question in 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970). Although Dutton in-
volved a state co-conspirator rule instead of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801, the state rule actually admitted a broader cat-
egory of coconspirator statements. Nevertheless, a plural-
ity of this Court found that the rule did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause and a fifth Member of the Court, Justice 
Harlan, reasoned that the Confrontation Clause was not ap-
plicable at all. In Dutton the plurality stated that "we do not 
question the validity of the co-conspirator exception applied 
in the federal courts." 400 U. S., at 80. Upon closer exami-
nation today, we continue to affirm the validity of the use of 
co-conspirator statements, and we decline to require a show-
13 The court in Ordonez found a Confrontation Clause violation because 
the Government, after introducing drug ledgers containing entries made 
by unidentified co-conspirators, did not adequately demonstrate that it was 
totally unable to identify those conspirators . 
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ing of the declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to their 
admission. 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
.· 
) 
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This case is here on certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Respondent was indicted in a drug conspiracy 
case. At his trial, evidence - obtained by a lawful 
wiretap - included conversations between respondent and a 
co-conspirator. Respondent objected to the admission of 
these taped conversations/ because the co-conspirator was 
~· not made available for cross examination. He argued that 
.1\ 
under the ~n~tation Clause, / the wiretap evidence was 
inadmissible . ) unless the government showed the 
unavailability of the witness to testify. -- ~
The District Court admitted the evidence, and 
respondent was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
V'"{, , / 
holding that our decision in Ohio v. Roberts/ required ~he 
c4; aW a ~ e.; ill~,..., seq-
government to show unavailability. ~ 
For reasons set forth i~ ~ opinion~ ~d.ay 1 
wit~ the Clerk,] we hold that the Confrontation Clause does 
not require / a showing of unavailability/ as a condition to 
- lc::a.-
admitting ~ co-conspirator's statements. 
" 
' The Roberts case is not to the contrary. 
Different principles apply to a co-conspirator's 
statements. In this case, the reliability of statements 
is not an issue I as the tapped conversations were 
available. 
We hold only that the Confrontation Clause does 
not require a showing of the co-conspirator's 
unavailability. 
Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals 
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Justice Brennan joins. 
.. ' 
.· 
March 18, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for United States v. lnadi, No. 84-1580 
~o. 85-705 Molt v. United States 
Petitioner, among 40 others, was charged with conducting 
a drug smuggling operation. At triaL five co-defandants 
testified against petitioner, recounting many conversations among 
other conspirators. These statements came within the exception 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (E). Petitioner argued that 
the admission of these statements violnted the Confrontation 
Clause. No showing of unnvailability was made, and there was no 
cross-examination. ~he CA7 affirmed the conviction, reasoning 
that there was no Confrontation Clauqe violation. 
The reasoning of the CA7 d~es not apoear to be precisely 








March 18, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO •rHE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for. United States v. lnadi, No. 84-1580 
No. 85-1 Ohio v. Adkins 
No. 85-393 Ohio v. Counts 
ln two separate trial arisinq out of the same 
facts, petitioners were convicteo of aqqravated robbery, 
kidnapping, and aqqravated murder. During separate oolice 
interrogation, petitioner Adkins mointained that Counts had 
executed the robbery, kidnappinq, and murder . Petitioner 
Counts essentially confessed to the robbery but maintained 
that Adkins had executed the kidnapping and murder. ~he 
statements were in agreement as to other details of the 
crimes. r~hen thev \-tere brought into the same room, both men 
adhered to their prior statements. During Adkins trial, 
police testified as to Counts ' accusations at the ioint con-
frontation. During Counts ' trial, police testified as to 
Adkins' accusations at the ioint confrontation. Neither 
petitioner. was cross-examined at the other's trial. The 
Ohio Court of AppPats rPv~rs~d the convjctions. ThP court 
reasoned that cross-ex~mination at trial is generally rP-
quired, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 56 (1.980}. The 
court recognize~possible excePtion t''hen the testimony is 
otherwise a~missible under state law, but found that these 
statements did not fall under any such exception. No show-
ing of unavailability was made, nor was there an additional 
showing that the evidence was reliable despite being hear-
say. 'l'he Ohio Supreme Court denied discretionarY review. 
The reasoning of lnadi depends in part on the fact 
that the statements were made in furtherance of and in the 
course of a conspiracy , thereby satisfying the requirements 
of Federal Rule of &vidence 80l(d) (2) (E) . In this case, the 
statements were subsequent to the "conspiracy" , during po-
lice questioning . ln addition, the petitioners were not 
prosecuted for a conspiracy at all . For these reasons , 
lnadi does not control this case. To the extent that the 
confessions were interlockinq , a hold for Lee v . Illinois, 
No . 84-6807 might be appropriate . ln these-cases, however, 
the confessions were not even "interlocking" under the for-
mulation in Parker v . Randolph , 442 u. s. 62 (1979} (plurali-
ty opinion)--the case that Lee interprets , see slip op . at 
~------' -·-·~----------~---~-------------~--~·----··--· 
.. ' 
14-16. Therefore, 1 recommend that the petitions in these 
cases be denied. 
2. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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